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ABSTRACT
The world is fomiing into trade blocs. The European 
Community in Europe, the North American Free Trade Area in North 
America are the clear signs of this formation. Although it is hard to 
mention a concrete bloc in East Asia, there is strong potential in the 
region as well as many alternatives through which these countries may 
come together. This trend has two consequences for world trade. The 
first is the increasing intra-regional trade between the members. The 
second one is the increasing inter-regional trade among the three regions. 
These two consequences, automatically, leads to discrimination in trade 
and highlight the probable protectionist attitudes by these regions towards 
non-member countries. Under these circumstances, the countries that do 
not belong to any bloc will be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis these blocs in the
coming years.
ÖZET
Dünya ticari bloklara bölünüyor. Avrupa'da Avrupa 
Topluluğu (EC), Kuzey Amerika'da Kuzey Amerika Serbest Ticaret 
Bölgesi (NAFTA) bu bölünmenin açık göstergelerini oluşturuyorlar. 
Güneydoğu Asya'da böyle sağlam bir oluşumdan söz etmek güç olsa da 
bölge ülkelerinin bir araya gelmesini sağlayacak kuvvetli bir imkan ve 
seçenekten bahsetmek mümkündür. Dünyadaki bu gidişin iki ana sonucu 
vardır. Birinci sonucu blok üyesi ülkeler arasında artan ticaret hacmidir. 
İkincisi ise bu üç bölge arasında artan ticaret hacmidir. Bu iki sonuç 
tabiatıyla blok üyesi ülkelerin üye olmayan ülkelere karşı ayırım 
yapmalarına ve bir takım korumacı hareketlerin gündeme gelmesine sebep 
olmaktadır. Bu şartlar altında, önümüzdeki yıllarda, blok üyesi olmayan 
ülkeler blok üyesi olan ülkeler karşısında kayba uğrayan taraf konumunda 
olacaklardır.
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INTRODUCTION
History shows that countries support free international trade 
policies as long as it works to their benefit. As soon as they face 
significant foreign competition, they turn to be protectionist.
In the period between 1840-1870, Britain was the uncontested 
leader of the world economy. It had achieved the Industrial Revolution and 
had developed to the extent that it was able to control the world economy 
since other countries were in a weaker position. The world at that time 
needed the fíne quality British goods and there was no other country to 
challenge British leadership in trade. This situation had created a "natural 
protection" for Britain. In such an atmosphere, this country was supporting 
free international trade strongly because it was the great exporter without 
apprehending any competition. But at the beginning of the 20th century, 
the picture changed because some of the other countries had caught up 
with Britain and they had started to compete with it. As Britain's 
leadership position weakened and as competition increased, the support 
that Britain had provided to free international trade decreased. It had 
decreased to such a level that Britain, itself, had to resort to some kinds of 
measures in order to protect its economy. After then, the world economy 
went through protectionist years.
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However, after World War II, while European countries were 
suffering from the destruction of the war, the United States benefited 
economically. The world economy was devastated, it needed a leader to 
restore it and this was the United States since others had no power. The 
United States was anxious about taking this leadership because it was 
going to have the chance of restoring European and Japanese economies to 
its own benefit. The conditions were ripe for the United States to establish 
its leadership since the other nations were not in a position either to reject 
or to compete. Just like the British case, the United States supported free 
international trade strongly in this period since the others needed American 
goods and leadership to restore their war-destroyed economies.
But in the 1970s, the picture had changed. The countries 
whose economies had been destroyed during the war had recovered to such 
an extent that they started to challenge American leadership. The Newly 
Industrialising Countries in the Pacific Region together with Japan had 
been successful in developing their economies through export-led growth. 
The Europeans decided to form a community to facilitate their trade 
relations and to create a big market within which they could be more 
competitive and strong towards the rest of the world. The United States, 
soon after the war, had taken the initiative to fonn a General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade to open markets in the world and this had worked 
successfully until that time. But during the 1970s, disputes started in 
GATT talks. Now, the countries did not need the United States anymore.
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because they had their own strengths and wanted to protect them. Since 
each country had its own interest that did not coincide with the others', 
talks on free international trade came to a halt. During this period, 
protectionist tendencies increased in the fomi of non-tariff barriers since the 
traditional measures had been restricted by the GATT. Even the United 
States itself began to search for ways of protecting its economy from 
competition outside. As others grew stronger in their economies, the 
United States lost control of its leadership, hence , of the world economy.
A world economy without a leader did not look so bright 
because the lack of a leader was leading to difficulties in the 
decision-making process and, hence, to disputes. Within this context, 
countries have experienced difficulties of bargaining with the rest of the 
world where many kinds of different interests exist. And it is natural that 
countries have started to look for other ways of guaranteeing their 
economic well-being
Regarding the above stated position of the world, countries 
have found it easier to bargain with a smaller number of countries which 
are both geographically and economically closer to themselves. As a 
result, European countries by fonning the European Community, the United 
States, Canada and Mexico by establishing the North American Free-Trade 
Agi'eement have already demonstrated the logic of the above factors.
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The main purpose of this study is to investigate the prospects 
for a trilateral economic world order, governed by three large regional trade 
blocs being the European Community in Europe, the NAFTA in North 
America and either Japan by itself or a bloc of Southeast nations centred 
around Japan in Southeast Asia. The study also analyzes the outcomes of 
such a fonnation and tries to show by trade data the increasing volumes of 
intra and inter-regional trade. This study finds the fonnation of such blocs 
and the increasing intra and inter-regional trade to be a new fonn of 
protectionism against the countries that do not belong to any of these blocs. 
In every period, countries have found some ways of protecting themselves. 
During the 1970s, it was the manipulation of the non-tariff barriers; 
currently, it is the formation of trade blocs with the idea of concentrating 
trade within and between the blocs. Nevertheless, the logic is always the 
same: being selective in order to maximise one's own interests. Naturally, 
the world involves many other countries apart from the members of these 
blocs, and they, of course, are the ones who should take this issue most 
seriously. In accordance with the above, chapter 1 of this study provides a 
short historical background of the conditions which led to the need for 
forming these blocs. Chapter 2 defines what a trade bloc is and then 
describes its characteristics. Chapter 3 analyzes with the European 
Community and examines its trade performance. Chapter 4 is devoted to 
the American continent. Both North and Latin America and their trade 
perfonnances are examined. In chapter 5, Southeast Asia and its trade
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perfomiance is studied. Finally, the conclusion provides an overview of the 
ideas employed in this study.
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CHAPTER 1
Historical Background
The economic era from the end of World War II until the 
1980s was one in which international economic interdependence in trade, 
monetary relations and one in which foreign investment advanced at a very 
rapid pace. It was argued that states were being integrated into a global 
market economy where national boundaries were losing significance. (1)
However, in the 1970s, the combination of a low rate of 
economic growth, mass unemployment and double digit inflation replaced 
rapid and stable economic gi'owth. The achievements of the rounds of 
trade liberalisation were being erased by the spread of non-tariff barriers. 
International economic interdependence began to shatter. (2)
Robert Gilpin explains the extraordinary performance of the 
world economy in the post-war era by three features: the favourable 
political environment, existence of beneficial supply factors and high 
demand. He argues that it was due to these factors that the economic
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policy was so successful and that the changes in these factors complicated 
the world political economy in the 1970s. (3)
The United States emerged from World War II as the 
dominant economic and military power while the economies of the other 
belligerent nations were destroyed, only the United States had the power 
and ability to restore the international economy and the system. This 
situation encouraged the United States to assume intemational obligations 
that made its allies depend on its leadership. (4)
At the end of the war, the United States committed itself to 
the revival of a liberal international economy both for political and 
economic reasons. The political and security ties with Western Europe and 
Japan fomied the political framework within which the liberal world market 
economy could operate. Under American leadership, all capitalist 
economies were allies. With American initiatives, successive rounds led to 
tariff liberalisation. The U.S. dollar was the basis of the intemational 
monetary system. (5)
The United States also assumed the defence burden of the 
industrial countries, and, made it possible for West Europeans and the 
Japanese to concentrate on economic development. Thus, American 
leadership provided the favourable environment within which the world 
economy could recover. But the era of American hegemony lasted only a 
few decades. By the 1980s, there was overwhelming evidence that the
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American economy had declined over the years. In the early 1950s, the 
United States with 6% of the world's population, had accounted for nearly 
40% of the gross world product,but by 1980, the American share had 
dropped to 22%. While in the early post-war period, the United States 
produced 30% of the world manufacturing exports, by 1986, its share 
dropped to 13%. American productivity growth, on the other hand, 
declined from 3% annually in the early post-war years to 0.8% in the 
1970s. As a result, the American economy became less competitive in the 
face of other advanced economies (Europe, Japan and the Newly 
Industrialising Countries: NICs). In capital fonnation, technological 
leadership, and the quality of the labour force (human capital), the United 
States was again falling behind. (6)
The American economy began to decline when the United 
States lost control over both the world monetaiy system with the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system and the world energy market. By the 1980s, 
American leadership and the favourable environment it provided was 
eroded to a great extent. The United States became unable to solve the free 
world's problems as it had done before. As a result, American policies 
became more self-centred while its power was declining, and conflicts 
between the United States and others increased. (7)
United States had become... less willing to 
subordinate its own interests to those of its 
allies; instead it tended more and more to
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exploit its hegemonic status for its own 
naiTowly defined purposes. (8)
America's exploitation of its dominant economic 
position was increasingly resented by its 
economic partners; yet they themselves were 
unable or unwilling to assume a gi'eater share of 
the responsibilities of managing the system and 
were pursuing their own narrowly defined 
nationalistic goals. (9)
The Reagan Administration's policies led to the deterioration 
of the long-temi economic position of the United States. There occurred a 
large budget deficit which caused American savings to drop. The budget 
deficit also meant decline in capital accumulation. This led to the decline in 
productivity and accelerated the deindustrialisation of the American 
economy. In short, the United States had been overconsuming and 
underinvesting for too long. Towards the end of the 20th century, the 
United States is caught between its commitments and decreased power.
As Soviet militaiy power expanded, the United 
States had assumed increased costs to maintain 
its hegemonic political and military position; 
simultaneously the rise of the newly industrial 
competitors and the loss of former economic 
monopolies in energy, technology and 
agriculture had decreased the capacity of the 
United States to finance its hegemony. (10)
The United States was able to mask its decline for many years 
by printing dollars and by boiTowing from foreign creditors, but this could 
only go on as long as the creditors retained their confidence in its ability to 
repay its debts. The relative decline of the American hegemony has 
seriously damaged the stable political framework that helped the expansion 
of a liberal world economy in the post-war era. Therefore, increasing 
protectionism, monetary instability, and economic crisis have developed. 
(11)
History shows that both political leaders and industrialists in 
leading industrialised market type economies support free international 
trade policies as long as they have no reason to apprehend significant 
foreign competition in production and sales. As soon as such apprehension 
develops, protectionist pressures appear in industrialised economies. In 
the British case, the free-trade movement was most successful during the 
period 1840-1870, a period during which Great Britain was the uncontested 
leading manufacturer and the foremost exporter of finished goods in the 
world. Looking at the situation in the United States, it can easily be shown 
that governments and industrialists were most supportive of an international 
fi'ee-trade system in the period extending from the early 1940s to the mid 
1960s, a period in which America became the leading industrial power in 
the world. In both instances, the enthusiasm for unhindered, 
non-discriminatory world trade weakened as soon as public leaders and
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private interests in the two countries sensed that their heretofore industrial 
leadership was threatened. (12)
Britain's uncontested world leadership in manufacturing 
throughout most of the 19th century and the similar American leadership 
during the two decades that followed the end of World War II provided 
these countries during those times with a means of "natural protection", an 
invisible protectionist shield that kept their manufacturers and businessmen 
free of any foreign competition. Under such conditions, supporters of the 
early 19th centuiy free-trade movement in Britain and the American 
sponsors of the free-trade oriented General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
of 1947 could easily demonstrate their enthusiasm for unhindered world 
trade.
This enthusiasm was not so much built on the 
logic of Adam Smith's denunciations of the 
regulations of the Mercantilist state, but was 
rather anchored to the perception of Britain's or 
America's world primacy as an industrial, 
financial and shipping power. Without the new 
technology developed by the British "tinkerers" 
during the last decades of the 18th century,
Adam Smith's arguments would have fallen on 
deaf ears. (13)
It was the perception of the potential gains that could be 
obtained from the technological advances achieved during the latter part of 
the century of enlightenment that induced ambitious English and Scottish
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entrepreneurs to lend their support to laissez-faire economic policies. It 
was the profits earned by the free-acting factory owners of Britain, in the 
period 1780-1850, that opened the doors to the British free-trade of the 
19th century. In the American case it was largely the advantage given to the 
American private enterprise by the extensive wartime destruction of the 
industrial capacity in other belligerent nations that allowed entrepreneurs in 
the United States to remain free of any apprehension of foreign competition 
until the late 1960s. The "natural protection" status bestowed upon the 
American economy during the years 1945 to 1965 only made it easier for 
politicians in the United States to condemn the controlled economic 
systems of the "Communist world". However, free trade which the 
Americans had so fervently embraced during the 1950s, could not easily be 
discarded when the European Economic Community and Japan began to 
challenge America's monopolistic position in world markets. (14)
It was in this context that the emergence of trade blocs took 
place. Actually, the United States had always been pursuing its 
self-interest. After World War II, it was to its own benefit to support the 
free international system, because then it was protected naturally by its 
hegemonic and leadership position. But when the free international 
economy stopped to serve its own benefits, the United States began to 
search for new ways of satisfying its new needs which had developed 
within the new circumstances of the world economy. By that time, Europe 
had started to act on its own, and it was strong unlike its position after
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World War II. It was trying to build itself the atmosphere which could 
serve its own interests the best. Within a complicated world, Europe was 
struggling to fomi a huge community to be able to guarantee and increase 
its power in the world economy. This, together with Japan, was posing a 
threat towards the future of the United States in the world economy. In 
addition, Japan and Europe were also acting for their own benefits. After 
World War II, they had been weak and as a result were dependent on the 
United States. They did not have a say so regarding the world economy. It 
was clear that to be able to say a word, one had to be economically strong. 
Over the years, they had become stronger while the United States was 
losing its strength. Now was the right time to make the necessary attempts 
to guarantee their position. In this atmosphere, every nation had a different 
stake in protecting and fighting for their economies. Therefore, negotiating 
within the GATT Rounds had become harder. In the old days it was easy 
because the United States was the leader, it was supporting free-trade and 
it was motivating the decision-making process towards taking decisions 
favoring free international trade. But now, the United States itself had 
started to fight against the increasing flow of Japanese exports. It had 
become impossible to reach decisions in the GATT Rounds. As a result, 
countries began to look for other kinds of solutions to their trade issues. 
Within this context, regional arrangements seemed to be the easiest and the 
best solution in a world full of different interests in which there is little 
possibility of their convergence.
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CHAPTER 2 
Trade Blocs
2.1 Introduction to Trade Blocs
"Trade Bloc" is a recently coined temi. It is the outcome of 
some developments that took place in the last two decades. Therefore, it is 
not a common term that can be found in the books written prior to the 
1990s. But beginning with the 1990s, it has attracted the attention of many 
scholars and a couple of books and articles can now be found which point 
to the formation of "trade blocs".
Peter Lindert has found it necessary to add a new chapter to 
his book Intemational Economics under the title of "Trade Blocs". In this 
chapter, he points out that in the 1990s, the world does business between 
giant trade blocs where large intemational economies act more and more 
like nations:
We are approaching a true world economy but 
are not yet there. Governments still restrict the 
intemational flow of people, Anns, goods, and 
money. Now, however; they do so largely as 
groups of nations acting together, not just as 
individual nations. More than anytime in 
history, there is something approaching a West
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European economic nation and a North 
American economic nation. These together 
with Japan, now account for 70% of the world's 
product. East Asia and the Third World face 
the challenge of dealing with the new blocs. 
(15)
In his book, Lindert also emphisizes the largeness of these 
economic blocs and provides an insight for a probable future.
....The West Europeans led the way. Since 
World War II, nations with a history of bitter 
warfare have integrated their economies ever 
more closely together. With the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome as a landmark, the nations of the growing 
European Community have removed all the 
usual taxes (tariffs) on trade among themselves.
In 1986, they passed the Single European Act, 
pledging to become virtually a single economic 
nation by 1992. Meanwhile the countries 
outside the European Community must bargain 
with an economic unit that has the second 
highest GNP, gross, not just national product, of 
any free trade unit in the world, larger than 
Japan and approaching that of the United States.
(Table 1) North America followed suit. The 
European Community's clear determination to 
form a giant almost national market by 1992 
may have given new urgency to the movement 
to make Canada and the United States a single 
market. (16)
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2.2 Definition
Some international groupings discriminate in trade alone, 
while others discriminate between insiders and outsiders on all fronts, 
acting almost like unified nations. To grasp what is happening in Western 
Europe and North America and what may happen elsewhere, the main 
types of economic blocs should be distinguishedas follows:
Table 1. Comparison of Canada-United States, European Community 
and Japan's population, and GDP per capita of the World.
Data for 1987 Population GDP per Total GDP Share of
(millions) capita (USD) (billions) World GDP%
Canada-US 270 18,397 4,962 33%
CANADA (26) 17,140 444 3%
US (244) 18,530 4,518 30%
EC (10 Nations) 340 11,744 3,998 27%
JAPAN 122 13,249 1,618 11%
WORLD 4987 2,985 14,884 100%
Source: Pclcr LINDERT, Inleriuitioiuil Economics (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin LTD., 1991).
1. A free-trade area in which members remove trade barriers among 
themselves, but keep their separate national barriers against trade with the 
outside world. In such an area, customs inspectors must still police the
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borders between members in order to tax or prohibit trade that might 
otherwise ignore some members' higher barriers by entering (or leaving) the 
area through low-barrier countries. One example of a free-trade area, tme 
to its name, is the European Free Trade Area fomied in 1960. Another is 
the Canada-United States Free Trade Area, which fonnally began in 1989.
2. A customs union, in which members again remove all barriers to trade 
among themselves and adopt a common set of external barriers, thereby 
eliminating the need for customs inspection at the internal borders. The 
European Economic Community from 1957 to 1992 has included a customs 
union, along with some other agieements.
3. A common market, in which members allow full freedom of factor flows 
(migi'ation of labour or capital) among themselves, in addition to having a 
customs union. Despite its name, the European Common Market (EEC and 
later European Community) was not a common market up through the 
1980s because it still had substantial barriers to the international movement 
of labour and capital. The European Community was scheduled to become 
a real common market, and more, by 1992.
4. Full economic union, in which member countries unify all their 
economic policies, including monetary, fiscal and welfare policies as well 
as policies toward trade and factor migration. Most nations are economic 
unions. Belgium and Luxembourg have fomied such a union since 1921. 
1992 was the year of full unity for the European Community though
-17-
governments may keep much of their tax autonomy and may not live up to 
the promise of full monetary union.
Lindert identifies the first two types of economic blocs as 
simply trade blocs. They are trade blocs because all explicit trade barriers 
are removed but the national barriers to the flow of labour and capital and 
the national fiscal and monetary autonomy are kept. (17)
In 1991, Jeffrey J. Schott wrote in an article published in The 
World Economy that the expectations of what eventually could be achieved 
in GATT talks were lowered due to the failure of the Brussels Ministerial 
meeting in December 1990, and that the concerns about the future of the 
GATT system were revived.In his article, he tests the contention that 
GATT had become dépassé, and that the multilateral trading system was 
devolving, de facto if not de jure, into regional trading blocs. (18)
Schott defines a trading bloc as an association of countries 
that reduces intra-regional baniers to trade in goods (and sometimes 
services, investment and capital as well). The purpose is "to give smaller 
economies the large region and the market they need to create the critical 
mass of production and sales to be competitive". Trading blocs seek to:
1. generate welfare gains through income and efficiency effects and trade 
creation.
-18-
2. augment negotiating leverage with third countries,
3. sometimes promote regional political cooperation.
The effect of bloc fomiation can be either trade-creating or 
trade-diverting. The liberalisation of trade barriers reduces transaction 
costs and trade policy iiritants within the bloc, thus encouraging intra and 
inter-industry specialisation, promoting economic efficiency and growth. 
Increased intra-regional trade results from both new trade creation 
generated by the income and efficiency effects, and third country import 
substitution, that is, trade diverted by the bloc preferences. If the latter 
effect is stronger than the former, the bloc may be on balance trade- 
diverting from the point of view of world welfare. (19)
Theoretically, the most desirable trade bloc is the one that is 
the most trade-creating, and that bloc is global. Such a bloc comprises 
countries with the most diverse range of comparative advantage, which 
affords the greatest scope for trade-creation and the least scope for 
trade-diversion. In practice, however; successful blocs i.e., those that hold 
together over time and that increase the welfare of their members usually 
exhibit four basic characteristics:
* similar levels of per capita GNP,
* geographic proximity,
* similar or compatible trading regimes,
* political commitment to regional organisation.
19-
The first factor pertains to the ability of the member countries 
to acconmiodate the redistribution of income and employment within the 
region resulting from the adjustments in trade flows. Blocs with wide 
disparities in national incomes face difficulties because producers in the 
richer countries are invariably seen as swamping those in the poorer 
countries, while the reverse is seen to occur with regard to labour. The 
second factor is geographic proximity. This is often a key factor because 
of the importance of transportation and communications, and because it 
may explain complementarities in the structures of the member economies 
that increase the benefits of bloc formation. Proximity is not a ticket for 
success, however. While most successful blocs have been among 
neighbours, many free-trade areas and customs unions among contiguous 
states also have been founded, particularly among developing countries. 
The third and fourth factors pertain to the durability of the trading bloc and 
the sustainability of the trading relationships among the member countries. 
Compatible trading regimes indicate similar, if not common, laws and 
regulations governing trade flows among members and between members 
and third countries. The administration of such policies, or the 
co-ordination of national trade policies , will require some regional 
organisation to manage the plurilateral trade relationship and to mediate 
disputes. For such a regional body to work usually requires a political 
commitment to dilute national sovereignty in favour of broader regional 
policies, though this commitment can sometimes be weak, as in the case of
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the European Free Trade Association and the Canada-United States 
Free-Trade Area. (20)
While liberalisation in GATT generally is applied on a 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis, trading blocs explicitly discriminate 
against outsiders by according trade preferences only to the partner 
countries. Even then, regional trading blocs are not inconsistent with the 
GATT because Article XXIV of the GATT allows exceptions to the MFN 
obligation for bilateral and regional aiTangements that remove bairiers to 
substantially all trade among the partner countries and that do not raise 
barriers to third country trade. These requirements are designed to 
preclude ad hoc discrimination through sectoral trade preferences that are 
likely to promote trade diversion instead of trade creation. (21)
In practice, however; the discipline of Article XXIV has 
fallen into disuse since the notification of the fomiation of the European 
Community, which was not contested on large part due to American 
interest in fostering a stronger and more united Western Europe. Since 
then, countries have frequently derogated from their MFN obligations 
without meeting the requirements of Article XXIV and without fear of 
retaliation. In most cases, GATT members hold back criticism of 
preferential trading arrangements lest their own pacts become subject to 
censure. Exceptions to Article XXIV have "set a dangerous precedent for
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further special deals, fragmentation of the trading system, and damage to 
the trade interests of non-participants". (22)
2.3 Identification
Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, in an article written in 
1992, conclude that a globalised economy does not yet exist, and in 
contrast, they highlight the fonnation of trade blocs as structuring the 
intemational economy;
The relationships between the three main 
trading blocs are considered and we ask how 
these blocs might affect the management or 
coordination of the world economy overall. In 
addition, we briefly analyse the effects this 
emergent system of blocs might have on a 
number of other parties in the intemational 
economy such as Eastern Europe\ex-Soviet 
Union, the Cairns Group economies and the less 
developed economies (LDCs). (23)
Hirst and Thompson perceive the formation of supra-national 
trading and economic blocs as the most significant and enduring 
development since the 1970s: "Now, clearly the European Community 
(European Community) and the NAFTA can be considered genuine blocs, 
or proto-blocs, without too much controversy." (24)
. 9 9 .
But are there any others? One obvious candidate is Japan, yet 
this hardly constitutes a bloc. Usually, Japan is seen as the centre of a 
proto-bloc encompassing much of the Southeast Asian Pacific Rim 
countries. Examination of trade and investment data show this to be 
premature but still a big potential. Therefore, Hirst and Thompson have 
found it better to consider Japan as a single country bloc while keeping the 
region as a potential one. (25)
Hirst and Thompson ask if globalisation will replace the 
existing emphasis on liberal multilateralism or not. Their suggestion is that 
it will not: A more likely outcome is the further development of a newly 
regionalized international economy possibly dominated by a trilateralism of 
the United States\NAFTA, the (expanded) European Community and Japan 
(with or without possible Pacific Rim allies). This itself will also involve 
an increase in bilateral negotiation between these major players and other 
lesser parties. (26)
The problem is the divergent interests that still 
characterise an international economy where, 
despite the claims of the "globalisation" 
enthusiasts, the nation-state and increasingly 
trading blocs remain the dominant players. (27)
As mentioned above, in such a system the major players will 
be the European Community, the NAFTA and Japan with or without the
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Pacific Rim countries. Trade will most probably concentrate within and 
between these blocs leaving other countries at a disadvantage. (28)
This trend has already shown itself to a certain extent. The 
subsequent chapters will analyse these blocs and their trade relations within 
and between the blocs.
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CHAPTER 3
The European Community
The concept of a European trade bloc is the easiest to explore 
as it has been in existence since the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The 
enlargement of the Community to twelve countries, along with the internal 
market reforms that are being implemented pursuant to the Single European 
Act of 1987, has created a cohesive and continental trading regime.
Moreover, the European Community bloc is both broadening 
its geographic scope and deepening its level of integration toward the 
creation of a continent-wide European Economic Space. This process has 
proceeded in several steps during the past twenty years; the enlargement of 
the European Community to twelve members, the conclusion of industrial 
free-trade areas between the European Community and the members of the 
European Free-Trade Association (EFTA), the growth of the network of 
association and preferential trading arrangements with sixty-six countries in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific under the Lome Agreement, the 
possible further expansion of the Community to include Austria, Sweden 
and possibly others during the 1990s (or the expansion of the European 
Community-EFTA arrangements into a customs union). (29)
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3.1 Structure and Characteristics
Of the three regions, the European Community best meets the 
four characteristics of an economic\trading bloc cited by Schott. The 
countries are at relatively similar levels of development (though the 
inclusion of Portugal and Greece has increased the variance); the national 
markets are, if not wholly contiguous, quite proximate to each other; 
external trade policy is more or less coordinated in Brussels (more on 
tariffs, less on services) which in turn promotes the convergence of national 
laws and regulations, and all members share by treaty a political 
commitment to the community (though differences exist regarding the 
extension of the European Community jurisdiction into some new economic 
areas and the degree of political cooperation). (30)
Since the inception of the European Community, the member 
economies have maintained a relatively homogeneous level of 
development, in 1958, the average European Community per capita 
income was about $975, with almost two-thirds of the total European 
Community population above that level. By 1988, more than 80% of the 
European Community had a per capita income above $12,800. Although 
Greece and Portugal were well below the average European Community 
per capita GDP of about $13,500 and Spain and Ireland only slightly more 
than half that amount, the combined population of the four low-income 
countries was less than 20% of the European Community total. The
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European Community has a "north-south" income imbalance generally 
favouring the northern members over the Mediterranean members (which is 
reflected in Italy as well), but it involves only a small share of the overall 
community and creates problems mainly with regard to agricultural issues, 
state subsidies, and trade in textiles and apparel. (31)
The European Community is comprised of geographically 
proximate, if not always contiguous, states. The addition of new members 
has expanded the geographic reach of the bloc, which now encompasses a 
greater share of the broader European Economic Space. The 
non-contiguous members (the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece) are 
separated by only naiTow stretches of sea, which often pose fewer 
problems for internal transport than the Alps. Nonetheless, European 
Community enlargement has focused attention on the need to reduce 
internal transport barriers, a key part of the 1992 agenda. (32)
The European Community involves complementary trading 
regimes and regional organisations. These were evident prior to the Treaty 
of Rome and now are fulfilled almost by definition by the European 
Community Commission, Council, and Parliament. In the 1950s, 
complementary trade regimes were forged by membership in the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and the European Coal 
and Steel Community. Since the formation of the customs union in 1957, 
the European Community has erected a common external tariff and
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jurisdiction over trade policy that rests in Brussels. While some non-tariff 
barriers have been maintained on a national basis, these controls are 
supposed to be harmonised on an European Community-wide basis or 
eliminated by internal market reforms. In sum, the European Conuminity's 
internal market reforms are contributing to the further integration of the 
European market and to the evolution of a strong regional trading bloc. (33)
3.2 Trade patterns
During three decades of its fonnation, the European 
Community has substantially succeeded in promoting the integi'ation of its 
member economies. The growth of intra-European Community trade has 
far outpaced the giowth of exports to third markets. In 1963, 
intra-European Community trade was less important than exports to the rest 
of the world; by 1979, intra-European Community trade was 20% higher 
than exports to the rest of the world. This ratio dropped during the early to 
mid 1980s due to the prolonged recession in Europe (and the more rapid 
recovery in the United States), higher oil prices, and dollar overvaluation. 
However; since the integration of the European Community economies 
began to accelerate as of 1985, both internal European Community trade 
and exports to the rest of the world have grown substantially. From 1986 
to 1989, intra-European Community trade rose from $451 billion to $678 
billion, an increase of 50%; exports to the rest of the world rose by 31% 
from $345 billion to $456 billion (Table 2). (34)
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The European Community has also strengthened its trade ties 
with its proximate neighbours in Europe, the members of the EFT A, with 
which it has had industrial free-trade areas since the 1970s. While almost 
half the giowth in European Community exports to the rest of the world 
since 1980 has gone to North America, the EFTA countries have been the 
fastest growing export market since 1985. (35)
Table 2. The European Community's exports, 1980,1986,1989 
(billions of dollars and percentage)
European Community-12 1980 1986 1989
Total Exports 691.2 100% 796.5 100% 1133.7 100%
of which :
Intra-Regional Trade 369.1 53% 451.3 57% 677.8 60%
Exports to ROW* 322.2 47% 345.2 43% 455.9 40%
To East Asia 25.8 4% 36 5% 66.2 6%
To North America 46.8 7% 84.9 11% 100.8 9%
' *ROW ; Rest of the World
 ^ Source: Jeffrey SCHOTT, "Trading Blocs and the World Trading System", The World
Economy 14. 1 (1992):’ 1-2.
From 1985 to 1989, European Community exports to EFTA 
grew by 84% from $64.3 billion to $118.2 billion compared to an export 
growth of 34% to North America during this period. Exports to EFTA
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members now account for more than 26% of total shipments to 
non-European Community countries; in turn, exports to the European 
Community account for almost two-thirds of total EFTA exports to 
non-members. Their strong dependence on the European Community 
market requires EFTA members to adopt trade regulations and product 
standards that are consistent with European Community norms, which in 
turn strengthens the integration ol the European Community and the EFTA 
economies. This process has effectively increased the size and geographic 
reach of the European trading bloc and created the conditions for 
negotiations for a European Economic Space. (36)
Moreover, imports also reflected the thesis that the European 
Community's trade was concentrated mostly within its own community. 
Table 3 shows that while imports from the rest of the world increased with 
a decreasing percentage between 1980 and 1989, European Community's 
imports from other European Community countries increased with an 
increasing percentage over the nine years. But regarding the imports from 
the rest of the world, the shares of East Asia and North America stayed the 
same (table 3). (37)
With respect to the above tables, it becomes clear that the 
European Community's trade is being concentrated within its own 
community borders and the percentage of the volume of trade with the rest 
of the world within its total trade is decreasing. This brings one to the
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conclusion that the European Community is selectively trading more and 
more with the members of its own community rather than the rest of the 
world. Therefore, the rest of the world will be at a disadvantage vis-a -vis 
the European Community with regard to their trade relations. While the 
percentage of the imports from the rest of the world decreased within the 
total volume of trade, the increase, although very small, with the other two 
regions is an important point, emphasising the thesis that trade will be 
concentrating more and more within and between the trading blocs.
Table 3. The European Community's imports, 1980, 1986,1989 
(billions of dollars and percentage)
European Community-12 1980 1986 1989
Total Imports 826.5 100% 781.4 100% 1165.8 100%
of w hich:
Intra-Regional Trade 399.5 53% 445.4 57% 677.2 60%
Imports from ROW* 427 47% 336 43% 498.6 40%
From East Asia 49 4% 63.9 5% 104.5 6%
From North America 85.8 7% 66 11% 104.2 9%
' *ROW : Rest of Ihe World
 ^ Source: Jeffrey SCHOTT, Trading Blocs and the World Trading System, The World Economy
14, I (1992): 1-2.
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The European Community is not the only region which 
shows the signs of being a trade bloc. There are other regions in the world 
that signal the fomiation of trade blocs. North America is one of these 
regions and the next chapter is devoted to the analysis of this region.
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CHAPTER 4 
North America
In North America, there has also long been a trading bloc that 
encompasses the world's largest integi'ated market: The United States of 
America. It, too, is expanding.
During the past five years, the United States has negotiated a 
series of bilateral agi'eements with Canada and Mexico; its largest and third 
largest trading partners respectively. A United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement was signed in January 1988. In the spring of 1991 negotiations 
began on a North American Free-Trade Area (NAFTA), including Mexico 
in a pact based closely on the United States-Canada model. (38)
Successful negotiations would create a North American 
trading bloc that encompasses a market about the same size and with the 
same population as the European Community and EFTA. In 1989, the 
European Community and EFTA combined had a GNP of $5,951 billion 
and a population of 358 million. The three countries of North America 
combined had a GNP of $5,943 billion and a population of 359 million. 
(39)
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4.1 Structure and Characteristics
Political interest and support for a prospective North 
American bloc derives significantly from the fact that the tliree economies 
are already integrated to a considerable extent. Business enterprises have 
already taken advantage of the close proximity of the three markets to forge 
substantial trade and investment ties between the three countries. The 
support of the business community in each countiy is an important factor 
behind the political commitment to regional arrangement. (40)
Both Canada and Mexico conduct two-thirds of their trade 
with the United States, and each benefits from substantial American 
investment in their economies. And United States’ trade with its North 
American neighbours accounts for about 26% of the total American trade. 
(41)
Another factor contributing to a shared interest in the 
development of a North American trading bloc is the fact that each country 
in the region runs a large current account deficit. Each needs to increase its 
exports to help redress these imbalances which effectively means that total 
regional exports to third markets need to increase substantially. Closer 
economic integration of the three countries could help promote economies 
of scale of production, increase productivity, and thus enable regional 
industries to compete more effectively in world markets. (42)
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Despite their shared interest in export-led growth, some 
complexities exist due to integrating economies. Mexico's per capita GNP 
is only one-tenth that of the United States and one-eighth that of Canada 
but its population is 30% of its northern neighbours. Mexican labour, 
productivity and wage levels are far below those in the United States and 
Canada. Such disparities exacerbate fears that the burden of adjustment to 
a free-trade area will fall dispioportionately on Mexican industry and 
American and Canadian unskilled labour. (43)
There are few precedents of successful free-trade areas 
between developed and developing countries. This could be due, however, 
in large part to the high protectionist walls insulating the poorer economies 
that make adjustment to free trade with an industrialised economy difficult 
and politically unsustainable. During the past five years, Mexico has 
unilaterally undertaken veiy significant trade and economic refomis that 
have substantially opened up most sectors of the economy to foreign 
competition. Today, Mexico's trade regime fits the American and the 
Canadian mould more than that of most other countries (except Chile) in 
Latin America. (44)
In sum, despite the disparity in the level of economic 
development between Mexico and its northern neighbours, the North 
American trading bloc exhibits most of the basic characteristics of a 
successful trading bloc. The members meet the geographic proximity test.
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have a strong commitment to regionalization, and because of the rapid pace 
of Mexican economic refomi, differences in trade regulatory systems are 
rapidly fading. (45)
4.2 Trade patterns
According to Schott, the evolution of a North American bloc 
is unlikely to diminish support in the region for the multilateral trading 
system. All three countries regard the regional relationships as a 
complement to their multilateral trade relations. (46)
Unlike the European Community, intra-regional trade accounts 
only for 36% of the combined total trade of the United States, Canada and 
Mexico (up only from 32% in 1980). Trade with East Asia accounts for 
23% of total trade tup from 18% in 1980) and the total is 18% for Europe 
(unchanged from 1980) (Tables 4 and 5). (47)
The importance (notably for the dominant American economy) 
of exports to third markets can easily be seen from Table 4. But the 
increasing trend, that within the exports to the rest of the world, the 
percentage of exports that go to East Asia and Europe shows an increase, 
should not be missed (Table 4).
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Table 4. North America’s exports, 1980,1986,1989 
(billions of dollars and percentage)
NORTH AMERICA 1980 1986 1989
Total Exports 304.1 100% 323.6 100% 509.2 100%
of which
Intra-Regional Trade
Exports to ROW*
99.5
204.6
33% 129 40% 205.3
67% 194.6 60% 303.9
40%
60%
To East Asia 52. 17% 58.9 18% 115.8 23%
To EC-12 67.4 22% 58.5 18% 100.3 20%
' *ROW : Rest of the World
 ^ Source: Jeffrey SCHOTT. Trading Blocs and (he World Trading System, The World Economy
14, 1 (1992):’l-2.
Therefore, it is true that the intra-regional trade within the 
North American trading bloc is a smaller percentage compared to that of 
the European Community. This brings one to the conclusion that if the 
percentage of exports from North America to the rest of the world is about 
60%, the strong support of the countries belonging to this bloc for the 
multilateral trading system is inevitable. However; when statistics are 
examined to find out the share of East Asia and Europe within this 
percentage (Table 4), it may be seen that most of the exports go to these 
regions. Hence, apart from supporting the multilateral system, maintaining
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good trade relations with these two regions becomes an important factor for 
the North American trade bloc.
Table 5. North America’s imports, 1980,1986,1989 
(billions of dollars and percentage)
NORTH AMERICA
Total Imports
1980
335.7 100%
1986
481.9
1989
100% 635.9 100%
of which
Intra-Regional Trade 107.5 32% 150.5 31% 210.4 33%
From ROW* 228.2 68% 331.4 69% 425.5 67%
From East Asia 64.2 19% 159.4 33% 202 32%
From EC-12 50.1 15% 90.6 19% 105.8 17%
*ROW ; Rest of the World
Source: Jeffrey SCHOTT, Trading Bloes and the World Trading System, The World Economy 
14, 1 (1992): 1-2.
As can be seen in Table 5, although there has not been a 
significant change in the percentage of intra-regional trade within the total 
volume of trade, the percentage of imports from East Asia has increased 
dramatically. In addition, the reason of the stable amount of intra-regional 
trade can be the lack of regional organisations at that time.
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4.3 Latín America
In the context of Latin America, "regionalism" has historically 
meant two very different things -intra-regional cooperation between the 
countries of the Latin and Central America themselves and inter-American 
or hemispheric cooperation involving the United States. Both date back to 
the 19th century. In the 1980s, there was a significant resurgence in the 
first of these types of regionalism, but this wave was political in nature such 
as the Contadora Group, Contadora Support Group, Group of Eight, Rio 
Group. (48)
More recently, the focus has been on proposals for economic 
cooperation and integration. Examples have been the attempts to extend 
and revitalise the Central American Common Market, moves to relaunch 
the Andean Pact, and the conclusion of a series of economic agi'eements 
between Brazil and Argentina since 1985, leading in July 1990 to the 
fomial commitment to create a common market between the two countries. 
In April 1991, this was extended to include Paraguay and Uruguay with the 
creation of Mercosur. (49)
The other kind of regionalism in the Latin American 
experience is between the Americas, covering the Western Hemisphere. 
The decision to make a North American Free-Trade Area an objective of
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American trade policy goes back to the United States Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979. A notable step was the successful negotiation of the United 
States-Canada Free-Trade Agreements, which came into effect in January 
1989. This, together with Canada's decision to join the OAS from 1990, 
marked a definite regionalist turn in Canadian foreign policy, which had 
been previously based on building up extra-regional relations and active 
multilateralism as a means of balancing the power of United States. (50)
In essence, Canadian trade is heavily weighted toward the 
United States, making guaranteed market access important to producers. 
Canada decided to participate in NAFTA, because it could not afford to be 
absent from the negotiating table. Just as Mexico feared trade diversion 
because of Canada's preferential access to the American market, so Canada 
faced a similar need to defend its trade interests. If the United States were 
to sign separate free-trade agreements with a multitude of countries, only 
the United States would have the preferential benefits of complete access to 
all markets. (51)
Another crucial development was the tumaround in the 
Mexican policy towards inter-American regionalism. For most of the 
1980s, Mexico had resisted the Reagan Administration's offers to negotiate 
a free-trade agi-eement. Mexico had two choices. It could either be with 
the Latin American countries or with the United States. Mexico's turn
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toward the United States reflects a rigorous facing of the facts. M. Delal
Baer points out that;
Dreamers may advocate trade integration with 
Latin America, but the region absorbs only a 
tiny fraction of Mexican exports. The uncertain 
prospects of accessing European Community 
markets after European Community's 1992 
unification and the difficulty of penetrating 
Asian markets propelled Mexico towards 
NAFTA. The world appeared to be fonning 
into regional blocs and Mexico did not want to 
be left out. (52)
In June 1990, President Salinas formally requested 
negotiations on a free-trade agieement. In the same month, on 27 June 
1990, President George Bush gave his "Enteiprise Initiative for the 
Americas" speech. This proposed the extension of the North American 
Free-Trade Area further south and pointed to the long-temi objective of a 
hemispheric free-trade area, one which would include both bilateral 
negotiations and agreements with the various intra-Latin American trade 
groupings. The Enterprise Initiative spoke of the importance of debt 
reduction and rescheduling but placed the greatest emphasis on 
encouraging foreign investment, both through continuing economic refonns 
within the countries of Latin America and by creating a multilateral 
investment fund. (53)
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The renewed Latin American interest in regionalist 
arrangements involving the United States -the return to the region- reflects 
in the first instance the relative absence of alternatives. This state of affairs 
is by no means new, but it has been accentuated by recent developments. It 
was clear by the early 1980s that the Third World movement would not 
serve as an effective platform for the promotion of the Latin American 
interests. Progress in expanding ties with Western Europe was also limited 
in the 1980s. On the other hand, Japanese involvement in the region grew 
in the 1980s, but it, too, fell short of Latin American expectations. (54)
For many in Latin America, it appears that this pattern has 
been reinforced by the dramatic events of 1989-1991. Though publicly 
applauded, the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe has 
led to an acute fear of marginalization. Latin Americans see themselves as 
competing with the newly democratic states of Eastern and Central Europe 
for a limited pool of aid, loans, foreign investment and technology. (55)
The fear that Latin America might be excluded from an 
increasingly protectionist Europe has increased the attractions of bilateral 
free-trade agreements with the United States. The perception that the 
multilateral trade negotiations were on the point of breaking down also had 
a contribution.(56)
Once the process of regionalism began, it took on a dynamic 
quality, feeding the image of ever-expanding regionalism and creating
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powerful incentives for other states to join in. Thus, Mexico's move 
towards accepting a free-trade agreement with the United States has forced 
the other countries of the region to reconsider their position; in the first 
place so as not to risk exclusion and the diversion of trade and investment 
towards Mexico, and second, because Mexico's "defection" undercuts the 
political and economic viability of a purely Latin American regionalism. It 
is, thus, hardly surprising that recent meetings of the Rio Group have been 
dominated by the problem of how sub-regionalism in Latin America can 
best be integrated with proposals for "macro regionalism between Latin, 
Central and North America". (57)
According to Andrew Hurrell, the year 1990-91 saw an 
increased regionalist momentum in the United States, though this has not 
yet reached the stage of a clear regionalist turn in foreign policy:
In the first place, there is a fear of what is 
perceived as the growing trend towards 
exclusive regionalism in other parts of the 
world. The image of Europe 1992 and the 
growing perception of Japan as an increasingly 
hostile and antagonistic competition have done 
most to refocus United States attention on Latin 
America. It is worth stressing that it is images 
and perceptions, far more than hard evidence or 
arguments, that have shaped United States 
thinking on regionalism. (58)
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These fears have been reinforced by increasing 
disenchantment with the GATT framework- with its institutional 
weaknesses, with the problems it had faced in dealing with the complexities 
of post-Tokyo Round issues, and with the difficulty of securing key 
Aiuerican objectives in the Uruguay Round, especially over trade in 
services, agriculture and intellectual property rights. Fears that the GATT 
system and the relatively liberal trading order that is embodied in it is under 
threat have been illustrated recently in the problems of the Uruguay Round, 
the deadlock over agricultural trade between the United States and the 
European Community, and the continued tensions in Japanese-American 
trade relations. (59)
But the shift in the American trade policy can be traced to the 
early 1980s; to the decision to push ahead with further multilateral trade 
negotiations, but at the same time to strengthen and safeguard American 
policy by broadening the range of options. One strand of this twin-track 
approach involved increased detenuination to use American power to force 
unilateral concessions from countries whose trade policies were deemed 
contrary to United States' interests, most visibly in the fomi of 
investigations and retaliatory measures under Section 301 of the 1974 
Trade Act and its super 301 successor. The other strand involved the 
conclusion of bilateral trade agreements, with Israel in 1985 and with 
Canada in 1988. These were intended to exert pressure on the European 
Community and Japan, there was an implicit message that if the Uruguay
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Round broke down, such measures would become the central thrust of 
American trade policy. (60)
Even if the GATT system holds together, the prospects for 
increased economic relations with other regions are not bright. The 
difficulties of political reform in Eastern Europe are becoming clearer by 
the day; the Soviet Union is an economic chaos, and economic relations 
with China are restricted by political frictions. Within these circumstances 
Andrew Hurrell argues that; "In a world in which free-trade can no longer 
be taken for granted, the United States needs Latin America as a market." 
(61)
NAFTA will enhance American competitiveness vis-a-vis 
Europe and Asia through the economies of scale and specialisation in 
production to be achieved with continental rationalisations. Tri-national 
clarity of investment rules will provide a stable environment for long-tenn 
production strategies. Most attractive is the production sharing option 
within North America. Production-sharing is a strategy that Asia and 
Europe have used to great advantage in penetrating American markets: 
Japan, for example, has deliberately shifted labour-intensive production to 
less-developed neighbours in Asia. A North American production-sharing 
alliance will help American industries to gain competitiveness in a world 
where multi-polar geo-economic rivalry is supplanting bipolar geo-strategic 
conflict. (62)
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The NAFTA talks occur at a delicate moment in world trade. 
The GATT system was seriously strained by the December 1990 stalemate 
at the Brussels ministerial meeting over issues pertaining to intellectual 
property, agriculture and services, if  the Uruguay Round stalls, or if only a 
minimal solution is cobbled together, confidence in the multilateral process 
will wane and tendencies toward regional or unilateral problem solving will 
increase. Fears of bloc formation may be exaggerated to the extent that 
NAFTA is unlikely to violate GATT principles. Global trade rules are a 
high United States priority given that 74% of American trade is conducted 
outside North America. Similarly, Japan's trade with its Pacific neighbours 
constitutes only 35% of its total trade, again reinforcing GATT priorities. 
Only Europe shows signs of bloc behaviour, the 12 European Community 
members conduct about 70% of trade among themselves or within the 
European Free-Trade Association. These trends explain why Japan is 
worried about the possible restrictive aspects of NAFTA, whereas the 
Europeans have been more sanguine. Within this context, the most 
attractive advantage of the formation of regional groupings is that they 
would create more manageable negotiating units. (63)
4.4 The United States
The critical role of leadership within the international trading 
system has been studied extensively. The Great Britain's leadership role 
from the mid 19th century to 1914 is widely recognised. The impact of the
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lack of leadership during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when world 
trade collapsed, was deep because the international economic system was 
rendered unstable by British inability and American unwillingness to 
assume responsibility for stabilising it. (64)
From 1945 to 1980, the United States was the unquestioned 
leader in world trade. American initiative led to the creation of the GATT 
in 1947, dedicated to non-discrimination among trading partners and a 
mutual lowering of trade barriers. The timing and the agenda of successive 
GATT rounds of negotiations were orchestrated by the United States and 
they led to a dramatic reduction in tariffs for manufactured products. 
Finally, the United States played the stabiliser role by keeping its import 
markets open in periods of stress, although with a significant lapse in 1971 
when a temporary import surcharge was levied in conjunction with the 
break of the linkage between the dollar and gold. (65)
The 1980s, however, were a period of important change in the 
world economy, including change in the American leadership role. 
Industrial development, investment and trade tended strongly to polarise 
regionally in Western Europe, North America and East Asia. About half of 
the world trade now takes place within these regions, and another quarter 
among them. (66)
The American share of world trade did not change greatly, 
but the trade balance turned sharply negative, with the result that the United
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States shifted from largest the creditor to the largest debtor nation during 
the decade. Even more fundamental, the United States lost its heretofore 
commanding technological lead, especially vis-à-vis Japan, and thus, its 
hegemonic position in industrial trade and investment. (67)
In the 1980s, the long-standing American stabilising role in 
world trade was severely challenged by the most wide-ranging domestic 
debate over trade policy since the 1930s. Congressional initiatives for 
import restrictions to counter the trade deficit were put forward. Ernest H. 
Preeg says that; "During these years, there was a shift in the American role 
from being the "one stabiliser to being one of the three stabilisers." (68)
Thus, the leadership role in the GATT also changed markedly 
during the 1980s. Earlier GATT rounds were limited to tariff cuts and 
codes for some non-tariff barriers, but the new Uruguay Round, at 
American insistence, went much further, including trade in services, 
intellectual property rights and trade related investment measures. Other 
American objectives were to integrate newly industrialised countries more 
fully into the GATT and to bring the agricultural sector within the GATT 
nonns for market-oriented trade. (69)
There is no question that American leadership has been 
dominant and critical throughout the Uruguay Round period -more than ten 
years since the initial American proposal for a new round in 1981-in 
establishing the agenda and keeping political minds focused on the need to
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achieve substantial results if the GATT multilateral is to remain a credible 
foundation for the world trade. (70)
One of the most important acts was the American decision to 
challenge the protectionist European agricultural policy. This brought the 
talks to a stalemate and even to failure. The predominant American 
leadership role in the GATT reflects, even more than elsewhere, the 
relative incapacity or unwillingness of the other two major participants, the 
European Community and Japan, to take major trade liberalising initiatives. 
The community has been preoccupied by internal priorities and especially 
since 1989, by historic opportunities within Europe that could come into 
conflict with the Uruguay Round objectives. The protracted nature of 
decision making within the community structure also tends to inhibit 
trade-liberalizing initiatives. Japan, on the defensive about impediments to 
access to its market and unwilling to negotiate any relaxation of its ban on 
rice imports, has played a basically passive role in the Uruguay Round. 
(71)
The perseverance of American leadership in the GATT, 
Uruguay Round negotiations has been offset to some extent, however, by 
other actions the United States has taken in the trade field that tend to 
weaken its overall commitment to the multilateral trading system. One 
important change in American trade policy has been the increased
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prominence of bilateral and unilateral actions, initiated outside the GATT, 
to handle trade issues. (72)
The United States carried on an almost continuous bilateral 
trade negotiation with Japan throughout the 1980s that culminated with the 
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) agreement in 1990. This interaction 
dealt with a wide range of important issues that often affected third 
countries as well. The wide-spread use by the United States of unilateral 
requests under Section 301 to open markets to American exports in 
selected countries, although it often produced trade-liberalizing results, is 
nevertheless contrary to the GATT approach based on reciprocal actions. 
(73)
The credibility of the GATT multilateral system was 
weakened during the 1980s by this strong American tendency toward 
bilateralism, whose scope in the future will be largely dependent on the 
final outcome of the Uruguay Round and how the associated agreements 
are implemented. Extending the GATT mandate to trade in services, 
intellectual property protection, and trade-related investment measures 
could bring most of American Section 301 activity within the GATT 
purview. Perhaps the most important, the little publicised Uruguay Round 
negotiating gi'oup on dispute settlement could play a pivotal role. The 
United States wants a more effective dispute settlement procedure in
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GATT, including change in the consensus rule for adoption of panel 
recommendations. (74)
An even more far-reaching change in American policy toward 
the GATT that evolved during the 1980s has been the official view th a t, 
under certain circumstances, the United States might turn away from the 
multilateral approach and restructure its trade relations based on regional 
trading blocs. President Ronald Reagan, for instance, said in 1985 that:
If these (new GATT round) negotiations are not 
initiated or if insignificant progress is made, I 
am instructing our trade negotiators to explore 
regional and bilateral agreements with other 
nations.' (75)
stated:
In 1988, James A. Baker 111, then Secretaiy of the Treasury,
If possible, we hope this follow-up liberalisation 
(to the United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement) will occur in the Uruguay Round. If 
not, we might be willing to explore a 
market-liberalization-club approach, through 
mini-lateral arrangements or a series of bilateral 
agreements.“ (76) *
* In a speech at the White House to business and congressional leaders, September 22, 1985
 ^ From a speech before the National Cotton Council of America in Memphis , Tennessee,
February 1988
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A year later, Carla Hills, the United States Trade 
Representative , testified before the Congi'ess:
Our strategic goal is to open markets.... We 
much prefer to use multilateral negotiations to 
achieve this end, but we will engage in bilateral 
and plurilateral efforts and take selective 
unilateral action where such can be effective.^
(77)
In December 1990, at the time of the failed Uruguay Round 
ministerial meeting in Brussels, Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher 
explained: "We could be okay either way (multilateralism or regionalism). 
The United States always could make regional or other agreements. In all 
truth, we are doing this now." (78)
The statements, usually in the fonn of quasi-ultimatums if 
others were not more forthcoming in the Uruguay Round, might be viewed 
primarily as a negotiating ploy. The fact remains, however, that such 
statements would simply not have been made in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
the GATT multilateral system, despite its shortcomings, was the essential 
basis of the American trade policy. Moreover, the United States has been 
negotiating free-trade agieements in North America, with the intent of 
creating a single free-trade region for the entire Western Hemisphere. (79)
Statement before the Senate Finanee Committee, June 27, 1989
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As a result of all of these, other nations are not clear what the 
United States is seeking for the world trading system over the longer run 
and are suspicious about American motives. Preeg asks:
Are regional free-trade agreements building 
blocs toward global free-trade or are they 
strategic economic groupings designed to 
become more competitive vis-à-vis other blocs?
(80)
The important point is to accept the fondation of such blocs. 
The fact that most of the countries need the multilateral free-trade system 
for their welfare does not change the outcome much. Building blocs and 
trying to become stronger in a way by creating synergy does not necessarily 
make the blocs inward-looking. The main issue is that with the existing 
blocs, most of the world trade is being conducted both within and between 
these blocs. And to do this, they do not need a multilateral system. 
Bilateral agieements between the blocs may sei've as well. The main 
concern remains for those countries who are not members of any bloc.
Most people argue that over the long-run, global free-trade 
will govern international trade. This is the ideal approach. Yet, one must 
not forget that nation-states or groups always act for their benefits as can 
easily be seen in a historical sui'vey. Even though a state may perceive the 
overall global benefits that can be attained from global free-trade, it can act 
in a different way, that is contraiy to the ideal, to be able to get the most
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benefit for its own. Therefore, apart from the long-term ideal, the 
fomiation of such blocs in the short-temi due to recent developments 
should not be so improbable. Every 40-50 years, there occurs a system 
change in the world. Now, the system that was governed by Bretton 
Woods and GATT has collapsed. (81)
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CHAPTER 5
Southeast Asia
During the 1980s, Southeast Asia experienced the strongest 
export growth of the three regions. The region's total trade more than 
doubled, and much of the growth was generated by sales to the North 
American market. Because of the strong growth in exports to third 
countries. Southeast Asia has been the only region in which the relative 
share of intra-regional trade to total exports remained basically the same in 
the 1980s, fluctuating from 34% in 1980 to 28% in 1986 and back to 35% 
in 1989 (Table 6). Its focus has been primarily outward oriented, 
particularly to the American market on which most of the countries in the 
region are highly dependent. However, imports of this region from the rest 
of the world have decreased over the years, but their imports from North 
America and European Community have not changed much, and their 
imports from the region itself have shown an increase (Table7).(82)
The concept of a potential East Asian trading bloc has been 
advanced in two somewhat related forms. Some see such a bloc emerging 
because the countries of the region seem to be coalescing around the 
region's dominant economy; Japan. Others regard the growing interest in
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Pacific Basin initiatives as the catalyst for a new trading bloc, with the 
United States and Japan at the core (so that the United States blocks 
Japanese dominance in the region). An East Asian economy centered on 
Japan is not a new idea. However, the sharp memory of the historical 
precedents of such a regional bloc (or Co-Prosperity Sphere) have long 
deterred formal initiatives to that end. Some analyses suggest that such a 
bloc may be developing on a de facto basis as countries in the region 
expand their trade and investment ties with Japan. (83)
Table 6. Southeast Asia's exports, 1980, 1986,1989 
(billions of dollars and percentage)
Southeast Asia 1980 1986 1989
Total Exports 283.1 100% 414.6 100% 641.4 100%
of which :
Intra-Regional Trade 96.4 34% 116.4 28% 223.6 35%
Exports to ROW* 186.8 66% 298.2 72% 417.8 65%
To North America 68.1 24% 153.3 37% 206.8 32%
To EC-12 41.6 15% 58.5 14% 100.1 16%
' *ROW : Rest of the World
 ^ Source: Jeffrey SCHOTT, Trading Blocs and the World Trading System, The World Economy
14, 1 (1992); 1-2.
The Economist cited four reasons for the emergence of a 
Japan-centered trading bloc; Japanese trade with other Asian countries has 
grown larger than its trade with the United States; Japanese imports of
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manufactured exports from Asian countries have grown dramatically; the 
growing internationalism of the yen and Japanese foreign direct investment 
in Asia has grown substantially. (84)
Table 7. East Asia's imports, 1980,1986,1989 
(billions of dollars and percentage)
Southeast Asia 1980 1986 1989
Total Exports 294.5 100% 308.7 100% 558.2 100%
of which
Intra-Regional Trade 92.8 32% 117.9 38% 224.5 40%
Exports to ROW* 201.7 68% 190.8 62% 333.7 60%
To North America
To EC-12
59.6 20% 69.9 23% 123.8
29.2 10% 40.4 13%
22%
77 14%
‘ *ROW ; Rest of the World
 ^ Source: Jeffrey SCHOTT, Trading Blocs and the World Trading System, The World Economy
14, 1 (1992): 1-2.
Japanese trade and investment in Asia has grown dramatically 
over the past decade, but so has Japanese trade and investment in North 
America and Europe. As shown in Table 8, Japanese trade with North 
America has been larger and grown faster than trade with Southeast Asian 
countries during the 1980s. Japanese trade with the Southeast Asian
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countries rose from 25% to 29% of total Japanese trade in the 1980s, 
however, trade with North America rose from 24% to 32% (after peaking 
at 34.8% in 1987). In addition, the European Community share of total 
Japanese trade almost doubled to 17% during the same period. (85)
Table 8. Japanese Trade with Southeast Asia, North America and the 
European Community
(billions of dollars and percentage)
Southeast Asia North America E C
X + M % of trade X + M % of trade X + M % of trade
1980 67.5 25 65.8 24.3 24.5 9.1
1981 70.9 24 75.1 25.4 27.1 9.3
1983 68.2 25 78.7 28.8 26.6 9.7
1985 71.6 23.5 105 34.4 28.9 9.5
1987 100.2 26.5 131.8 34.8 55.4 14.6
1988 126.6 28 150.6 33.3 70.9 15.7
1989 140 28.8 161.2 33.2 7601 15.7
1990 142.3 28.8 157.6 31.9 85.7 17.3
‘ Source: Jeffrey Scholl, "Trading Blocs and Ihc World Trading Syslcm", The World Economy
14, 1 ( 1991).
Japanese trade with Southeast Asia, since 1985, has increased 
twice as fast as trade with North America (and three times as fast since 
1987). This recent surge has been taken as a signal for future trends. 
However, since the first quarter of 1988, this trend has moderated, with
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Japanese imports from Southeast Asia growing at about the same rate as 
total trade. (86)
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Asia has 
shown similar growth in recent years, from a relatively low base. Outward 
investment to that region quadrupled from $2 billion to $8.2 billion during 
1985 through 1988, matching the growth rate of overall Japanese FDI in 
North America. However, more money was invested in Europe during this 
period, a cumulative total of $21.1 billion in Europe as supposed to $19.8 
billion in Southeast Asia (including the People's Republic of China). 
Unlike the trade flows, FDI in Southeast Asia accounts for only a small 
share of cumulative Japanese FDI. As of March 31, 1989, the Southeast 
Asian region (including the PRC) accounted for only 22.3% of cumulative 
Japanese FDI , compared to 40.3% for North America and 16.2% for 
Europe. About half of cumulative Japanese FDI has been in manufacturing 
and services. The composition differs by region. For example, FDI in 
manufacturing accounts for 34% of the total in Southeast Asia, 32% in 
North America and only 16% in Europe; in financial services, the regional 
breakdown is 49% in Europe, 16% in North America and 8% in Asia. (87)
The trade and investment data point to a growing 
intemationalisation of the Japanese economy, but not with the Southeast 
Asian region alone or with Southeast Asia more than other regions. The 
United States remains the primary focus for Japanese trade and investment
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and Europe -especially since the advent of the 1992 process -has become 
an increasingly important market. Japanese trade with the European 
Community almost tripled from 1985 to 1989 (from a lower base than trade 
with East Asia and North America), and more than half of Japan's 
cumulative $30 billion in FDl in Europe took place in 1987-1988. The 
growing internationalisation of the Japanese economy, coupled with 
ongoing political and cultural concerns in the East Asian region about 
Japanese hegemony, have spuiTed interest in regional grouping abroad 
involving both Pacific economic powers, Japan and the United States. 
From an Asian perspective, the logic of such a grouping would be to have 
the American shield to protect the smaller Asian economies from Japanese 
domination. Such considerations seem to be at least partially behind the 
initiative of the Prime Minister Hawke of Australia on Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), in which the United States and Canada 
now participate. Similar broadbased Pacific basin aiTangements also were 
proposed by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), which have now dovetailed into the APEC initiative. (88)
The APEC initiative establishes a broader regional grouping in 
the Pacific Basin that encompasses Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea 
and the ASEAN, as well as the United States and Canada. Hawke stated 
that;
The aim is not to create a regional trading bloc,
but rather to establish a mechanism by which
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the countries in the region could best take 
advantage of the possible economic 
complementarities... in the region and through 
closer economic cooperation...to also be a force 
within the world for arguing the case for a fleer 
international trading environment. (89)
Could the APEC initiative lead over the medium temi to the 
evolution of a regional trading bloc? First, the countries in the Pacific Basin 
(as defined b>' the APEC membership) are widely dispersed geographically 
and have diverse levels of economic development. Distances between 
markets in the region are quite large, even if one excludes the North 
American countries. Per capita incomes range from poor (Indonesia and 
the Philippines to modern South Korea) to comfortable Australia, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and New Zealand to wealthy United States, Canada and 
Japan. Integrating such a diverse and expansive region would pose 
enonnous physical and adjustment problems. (90)
Second, the last two characteristics of successful trading blocs 
postulated at the start of this study also seem to be lacking. Trade policies 
and regulatory regimes differ markedly from country to country, and there 
seems to be little political commitment to an evolving regional organisation. 
For example, the ASEAN countries have long been wary of economic 
arrangements in the region to the extent that, after twenty years, they have 
not yet even established a free-trade area among themselves. It is unlikely
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that the ASEAN would be interested in the development of a regional 
trading bloc, as long as multilateralism remains a viable alternative. (91)
Finally, the dependence of Southeast Asian economies on the 
American market argues against the evolution of a Southeast Asian bloc, 
for two reasons. First, it is more important for the Southeast Asian 
countries to maintain access to the American market- arrangements with the 
United States and, thus take precedence over regional trading initiatives (as 
evidenced by the strong interest of these countries in potential free-trade 
areas ). For these countries, bilateral trade pacts with the United States are 
seen as a defensive strategy against the potential increase in the American 
protectionism and wavering in the American support for the GATT. 
Second, and related to the first, these countries have a vested interest in the 
strengthening of GATT disciplines , which they believe provide the best 
safeguards against further encroachments on their access to the American 
and European markets. (92)
The Thai Prime Minister Anand summarised the sense of 
achievement at the 4th Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) held in January 1992. This gathering in Singapore 
of the heads of governments of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand produced agreements that have the 
potential to reshape the organisation, re-energize integration and enhance 
the stability of Southeast Asia. Unlike their previous meetings, the ASEAN
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leaders at the recent summit in 1992 showed that they arrived in Singapore 
with a sense of mission and purpose. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
noted the motivation for this movement in ASEAN:
The meeting is timely because ASEAN needs to 
consider appropriate responses to the profound 
changes that have taken place in the world since 
the last ASEAN Summit in Manila in 1987. (93)
The rapid economic changes, as President Soeharto mentioned 
in his address to the summit meeting, present new challenges to the 
ASEAN leaders:
Over the past few years, we have vigilantly 
monitored the cun'ents of economic integration 
and globalisation. This development will have 
negative effects on the economies of the 
developing countries if it is followed by the 
establishment of groups among countries and 
eventually leads to closed and protectionist 
economic blocs. (94)
The economic changes requiring appropriate responses are, 
notably, the increased integration of European states in 1992 and the 
projected formation of a North American Free-Trade Area. At the 
Singapore Summit, the ASEAN states responded with a pledge to establish 
an ASEAN Free-Trade Area (AFTA), but the reasons for this pledge go 
beyond external economic imperatives. On the political level, two 
additional developments have induced the ASEAN states to act together.
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For close to 15 years, despite ASEAN's role, Cambodia appeared fimily 
mired in genocide, civil war and occupation. However; this issue has now 
been removed. Some observers welcome the end of this divisive problem 
as it will relieve the ASEAN members of the need to reconcile their 
different perceptions and policies towards China and Vietnam. 
Coincidentally, while the Paris Peace Agi'eement for Cambodia was being 
signed, much of the ground work for the summit's economic plan was laid 
at the annual ASEAN Economic Minister's Meeting in October 1991, when 
members decided to take steps towards a free-trade area by accepting the 
Indonesian plan for establishing a Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT). The CEPT will slash existing tariff rates to 20% within eight 
years and reduce rates from 20% to 0% in the following seven years. (95)
Indonesia has long been hesitant to open its markets to 
competition; thus, at first glance, the CEPT Proposal by Indonesia seems 
to mark a change in its economic policy. With the strong support for some 
kind of economic cooperation coming from other ASEAN partners -the 
Philippines proposed a treaty, Thailand held out AFT A , and Malaysia 
worked for an Asian trade grouping -Indonesia had to pennit some progress 
in this area. As Indonesian Prime Minister Arifin Siregar observed: "If 
ASEAN does not rapidly form the AFTA, it is feared that ASEAN 
countries might join other planned free-trade zones outside ASEAN which 
would only weaken ASEAN unity." (96)
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Malaysia had been advocating a Southeast Asian Economic 
Group (EAEG), arguing that the Pacific Rim states needed to coalesce in 
response to the actions of the European Community and North American 
states. The American opposition to this initiative divided support within 
ASEAN because several members sought to preserve their beneficial trade 
with the United States. Others preferred APEC, seeing EAEG the 
beginning of a fragmented world on racial lines. Also, there are attempts to 
integrate China into the regional process. The ASEAN organisation has 
begun treating China in an official way. The leaders at the 1992 ASEAN 
Summit invited China to the next minister's meeting in Manila. (97)
All the above statements lead one to the conclusion that, even 
though the countries of the region do not fully satisfy the basic 
characteristics of successful trade blocs, they are fully aware of the 
direction where the world economy is going. Since they do not want to be 
left out or remain in a disadvantageous position, they are willing to come 
together, therefore, they are a major potential for fomiing a bloc in the 
Southeast Asian region.
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CONCLUSION
Trade blocs is a tenn which has started to be used recently in 
international political economy. In the period between 1945-1970, no one 
could have found the occasion to use this term.
It was the period after the World War 11. Europe and Japan 
were in a bad economic and political position. The United States was, on 
the other hand, in a strong position because due to its geogi’aphical 
location, it had been successful in staying away from the destructiveness of 
the war. At those times, the world economy was also in a chaos. The 
European nations and many others were in need of help and there was 
disorder in world trade. To bring order to the system, a leader was needed. 
The United States was ready to assume such a role because it had the 
power. In addition to this, it also had the willingness since it was longing 
for establishing its own rules in the world, both politically and 
economically. Politically, it wanted to stop communism and even to 
destroy it and knew veiy well that it had the opportunity of taking the 
economically weak nations on its side and this would again be through the 
use of economics. The other nations were also ready to accept American 
leadership since they had no other chance to survive.
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In this atmosphere, the United States assumed the leadership 
role and began to establish its own rules. The first thing is that it needed a 
large market to sell its excess goods. The timing was ripe since it would not 
be challenged by any other nation because at the moment they needed the 
American goods. Hence, the United States was naturally protected against 
any kind of competition. The main component of its leadership was a free 
international trade system which its goods would easily and cheaply 
penetrate. Therefore, it established the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade to serve its international trade interests. In that period, tariffs were 
decreased and international trade was liberalised to a great extent. But as 
these improvements were being made, the other nations had the opportunity 
to recover from the wartime destruction. As they recovered, their own 
interests started to conflict with those of the United States. At the earlier 
times, the United States had the power to lead in the decision making 
process. But, with the beginning of the 1970s, the United States began to 
lose its hegemonic power. It lost a war in Vietnam and spent a lot of 
money for its fight against communism. It started to show deficits in its 
accounts. Its status began to shift from being the largest creditor to debtor. 
While the United States was losing its power and leadership, some nations 
were gaining strength in the system. The Newly Industrialising Countries 
of the Pacific together with Japan, were very successful in strengthening 
their economies through export-led growth. With their huge volume of 
exports to the world, they were able to challenge the position of the United
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States. Moreover, Europeans, with the lessons they had taken during 
World War II, fonned a community within which they could increase the 
size and the potential of their markets. The war had been a very good 
example to the nations of the world that to guarantee the existence of a 
miation, economic strength was a must. Therefore, economic power and 
wealth became the number one priority for countries in the postwar period.
While the devastated economies were recovering from the ashes of the 
war, they began to gain strength. Naturally, every one of them had its own 
priorities which did not coincide with the others'. At this moment, apart 
from challenging the United States, they also started to conflict with the 
American interests. The United States had always been a leader in the 
GATT decisions, but now the decision making process turned out to be a 
problem. After the 1970s, the nations of the world began to have problems 
in taking decisions in the GATT talks. There were many disputes because 
every nation had a special demand regarding its own interest which was to 
the disadvantage of the others. And, unfortunately, the United States was 
not strong enough to enforce the decision-making process anymore. Now, 
there was no leader to run the world economy. The major supporter of free 
international trade, the United States itself, started to take some measures 
in order to protect its economy.
Under these circumstances, countries started to look for other 
ways of guaranteeing their interests and trade activities. It was this 
atmosphere which led to the grouping of countries in order to speed up the
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decision making process in accordance with their own interests. The idea 
of a European Community has long been in existence. Facing the large 
market of the United States, the Europeans had thought of creating a 
market with the size and potential similar to that of the United States. Only 
in this way could they be strong enough to compete with the United States. 
During the 1980s, the GATT talks came to a halt and little hope was left 
regarding its success. The multilateral system began to shatter. The use of 
non-tariff barriers increased. The Europeans set their agenda for a common 
market to be effective as of 1992. In 1991, the communism was shattered 
in the Soviet Bloc. Now, the United States did not need a strong Europe 
anymore. But, during the post-war period it had willingly created a giant 
from which now it was facing competition.
The decision of the European Community to become a single 
market by 1992 made a domino effect all over the world. The fact that now 
the nations of the world have to face and compete with a market about the 
same size as the United States, led the other countries of the world to 
reconsider new alternatives to guarantee their future in a world with a huge 
European Community. The first reaction came from the United States by 
the initiatives to establish the North American Free-Trade area to increase 
the size, potential and competitiveness of its market vis-à-vis the European 
Community. Both Canada and Mexico decided to take part in this so as 
not to be left alone. Concerns in the Latin American countries have also 
reached serious levels so that they have also started to search for
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alternatives within a world of trade blocs. In the Southeast region Japan 
itself has been acting like a bloc for long. But, the countries of the region 
have started to consider alternatives to fonn a bloc.
In chapter 3, trade blocs are defined and their characteristics 
have been identified. It has been seen in the later chapters that all of these 
regions show the main characteristics of successful blocs. The European 
Community is already a bloc wliile NAFTA is still in the fonnation stage. 
In the Southeast region there is not a concrete bloc yet, and it is hard to 
estimate the kind of fonnation. But it is highly probable that in Southeast 
Asia there will also be a bloc since none of the countries would risk being 
left out -due to the domino effect. This is likely to lead to a trilateral 
economic world order. Other kinds of formations may also occur in the 
other regions of the world, but since they will not be as strong as these 
major blocs, their effect will be insignificant. Automatically, trade will 
concentrate within, and also between these blocs. Almost every country 
needs the rest of the world for its trade, therefore, inter-bloc trade will also 
be veiy active.
Most scholars argue that the division of the world into trade 
blocs is not probable since almost all the nations of the world have a big 
stake in the multilateral system. It is true that countries need the 
multilateral system to a great extent, but one should not forget that with the 
fonnation of these blocs trade concentrates both within and between the
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blocs, not only within them. The trading opportunities for those who 
belong to a bloc increase because then they have an advantageous interior 
market in addition to other organised markets that belong to the other blocs. 
Of course, the ones who will cry out for multilateralism will be those who 
will not be a member of any bloc. History shows that countries are selfish 
units that act for their own benefits. Global free trade is an ideal. It is an 
ideal far away from the reality as long as inequalities and disparities exist 
between the countries. As long as each country acts to maximise its own 
interests, agreement of all the nations at one single point is very hard. 
International consensus might be a dream for the world society or it might 
be a status which is very hard to attain. But the reality of today is simple; 
there is disorder in the world economy, taking decisions on the global level 
with many countries at different levels is very hard. However in such an 
atmosphere there is hope for success for those countries who can come 
together. Some countries have already achieved this, so others would not 
want to miss the opportunity. Nations have always found ways of 
protecting themselves at different times in histoiy either by tariffs or 
non-tariff barriers. The logical and fashionable way of protection in our era 
is the formation of trade blocs against other blocs and non-bloc countries. 
If the idea is to discriminate and be seleetive, there is no easier way of 
discrimination and selection than forming and taking part in these blocs.
Under these circumstances, growing competition threatens to 
increase economic nationalism. Sectoral protectionism has gained strength.
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the conflicting desires of nations both to protect particular sectors and to 
acquire for markets in the same industries strongly encourage this New 
Protectionism. A mixed system of nationalism, regionalism and sectoral 
protectionism is replacing the Bretton Woods system of multilateral 
liberalization. Now, there is a powerful incentive for governments to 
manipulate economic policies in order to advance their economic, political 
and related interests. The difficulties of pluralist leadership, the resistance 
of many advanced economies to economic adjustment and domestic 
priorities threaten further dissolution of the unity of the liberal international 
economic order. In a world of increasing uncertainty and politicized 
economic relations, more closely integrated regions would be able to 
confront other emergent centers of economic power more effectively.
The tendency toward greater regionalization means that large 
segments of human race will be excluded from the world economy. The 
Common Wealth of Independent States lies outside these regions, and a 
number of East European countries, with the failure of the debt-financed 
industrialization strategy of the 1970s and under the pressure of the 
ex-Soviet Union, will only be partially integrated. The Southern Cone 
(Argentina, Chile, Peru, etc.) and other Latin American countries that had 
become integi'ated into the world economy will be falling out of the system. 
Much of Black Africa has become marginalized and is sinking into 
economic and political despair. Where China, India and Brasil, nations 
with immense potential, will eventually fit is not yet determined. There is a
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great danger that a more regionalized world economy will be composed of 
a few islands of relative prosperity in a turbulant sea of global powerty and 
alienated societies.
-73-
NOTES
1. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of Intemational Relations ('New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 341.
2. Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge; Nashville, MIT Press, 
1988), p. 40-48.
3. Idem, The Political Economy p. 343.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 344.
6. Ibid.
7. Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., "Beyond Laissez Faire". Foreign Policy 87 
(1992), p. 67-87.
8. Idem, The Political Economy p. 345.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 347.
-74-
11. Jan Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1985), p. 39-40.
12. Sima Lieberman, The Political and Economic Roots of the New _ 
Protectionism (New Jersey; Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), p. 8-11.
13. Ibid., 15-16.
14. Ibid.
15. Peter Lindert, International Economics (Illinois: Ii-win Ltd., 1991), p. 7.
16. Ibid., 4.
17. Ibid., 5.
18. Jeffrey Schott, "Trading Blocs and the World Trading System", The 
World Economy 14: 1 (1992), p. 1-2.
19. Ibid., 2.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.,3.
22. Ibid., 4.
-75-
23. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, "The Problem of Globalization; 
International Economic Relations, National Economic Management 
and the Fomiation of Trading Blocs", Economy and Society 21: 
4(1992), p. 358.
24. Ibid., 369.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 370.
27. Ibid., 375.
28. Karl Kaiser, "A View from Europe: The United States Role in the Next 
Decade", International Affairs 65: 2 (1989), p. 5820-5822.
29. Amiand Clesse and Raymond Vernon, "The European Community 
After 1992: A New Role in World Politics" (Baden-Baden, n. p.,1991), 
p. 185.
30. Idem, The Problem of Globalisation p. 376.
31. Ibid., 377.
32. Ibid., 378.
33. Ibid.
-76-
34. Ibid., 380.
35. Ab. De la Torre and M. R. Kelly, Regional Trading Arrangement 
(Washington, D.C.; International Monetary Fund, 1982), p. 10.
36. Jeffrey Schott, "Trading Blocs and the World Trading System", The 
World Economy 14: 1 (1992), p. 7.
37. Ibid., 8.
38. Charles A. Cerami, "NAFTA; A Prospect of Hemispheric Growth", 
Dialogue 3; 97 (1992), p. 9.
39. Idem, Trading Blocs p. 7.
40. Idem. NAFTA p. 10.
41. Idem, Trading Blocs p. 7.
42. Idem. NAFTA p. 10.
43. Idem. Trading Blocs p. 8.
44. Ibid., 9.
45. Ibid., 8.
46. Ibid.
-77-
47. Ibid., 9.
48. Andrew Hun'ell, "Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional 
Bloc of the Americas". Intemational Affairs 68: 1 (1992), p. 121.
49. Ibid., 122.
50. Robert A. Pastor, "The Latin American Option", Foreign Policy 85: 
(1992), p. 108.
51. M. Delal Baer, "North American Free Trade", Foreign Affairs 70: 4 
(1991), p. 146.
52. Ibid., 134.
53. Idem, Latin America p. 122.
54. Ibid., 123.
55. Ibid., 124.
56. Charles A. Cerami, "NAFTA: A Prospect of Hemispheric Growth", 
Dialogue 3: 97 (1992), p. 9.
57. Idem, Latin America p. 128.
58. Ibid., 128.
-78-
59. Ibid., 129.
60. Jagdish Bhagwati, "The World Tradinti System at Risk". (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 48.
61. Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional 
Bloc of the Americas", International Affairs 68: 1 (1992), p. 129.
62. M. Delal Baer, "North American Free Trade", Foreign Affairs 70: 4 
(1991), p. 140.
63. Ibid., 146.
64. Eniest H. Preeg, "The US Leadership Role in World Trade: 
Past,Present and Future", The Washington Quarterly 15: 2 (1992), p. 
81.
65. Ibid., 82.
66. Walter Russell Mead, " The United States and the World Economy", 
World Policy Journal 6 0989): p. 9.
67. Lawrence A. Fox and Stephen Cooney, "Protectionism Returns" 
Foreign Policy 84: 53 (1992), p. 78.
68. Idem, The US Leadership p. 82.
-79-
69. Ibid., 83.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 84.
72. Biswajit Dhar, "The Decline of Free Trade and U.S. Trade Policy 
Today", Journal of World Trade 26: 6 (1992), p. 134.
73. Carl Svemlov, "Super 301: Gone but not forgotten", Joumal of World 
Trade 26: 3 (1992), p. 125.
74. J. Michael Finger, "The Old GATT Magic No More Casts Its Spell: 
How the Uruguay Round Failed", Joumal of World Trade 25: 2 (1991),
p. 20.
75. Ernest H. Preeg, "The US Leadership Role in World Trade: Past, 
Present and Future", The Washington Quarterly 15: 2 (1992), p. 83.
76. Ibid., 84.
77. Ibid., 85.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., 86.
80. Ibid., 87.
-80-
81. Lester Thurow, "Head to Head: The Comini; Economic Battle Among 
Japan. Europe and America", (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, Inc., 1992), p. 65.
82. Jeffrey Schott, "Trading Blocs and the World trading System", The 
World Economy 14: 1 (1992), p. 11.
83. Stephen W. Bosworth, "J'he United States and Asia", Foreign Affairs 
71: 1 (1992), p. 123.
84. Idem. Trading Blocs p. 12.
85. Kym Anderson, "Is an Asian-Pacific Trade Bloc Next?", Journal of 
World Trade 25: 4 (1991). p. 29.
86. Idem. Trading Blocs p. 12.
87. Ibid., 13.
88. Idem. The United States and Asia p. 120.
89. Idem. Trading Blocs p. 13.
90. Ibid., 14.
91. Ibid., 15.
-81-
92. Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another 
Summit?", Contemporary Southeast Asia 14: 2 (1992), p. 143.
93. Jeffrey Schott, "Trading Blocs and the World Trading System", The 
World Economy 14:1 (1992), p. 14.
94. Ibid., 15.
95. Ibid., 96.
96. Ibid., 16.
97. Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and America: Global Partners", Foreign 
Policy 86 (1992), p. 33.
-82-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANDERSON, Kym. "Is an Asian-Pacific Trade Bloc Next?" Joumal of 
World Trade 25:4 (1991), p. 24-41.
ANTOLIK, Michael. "ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous; Just Another 
Summit?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 14:2 1992, p. 
142-153.
BAER, M. Delal. "North American Free Trade." Foreign Affairs 70:4 
(1992), p. 132-150.
BHAGWATl, Jagdish. Protectionism. Cambridge: Nashville, MIT Press, 
1988.
BHAGWATl, Jagdish. The World Trading System at Risk. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991.
BOS WORTH, Stephen W. "The United States and Asia." Foreign Affairs 
71: 1 (1992), p. 113-130.
CERAMI, Charles A. "NAFTA; A Prospect of Hemispheric Growth." 
Dialogue 3; 97 (1992), p. 8-12.
DE LA TORRE, Ab. and M. R. Kelly. Regional Trading Arrangements. 
Washington, D.C.; International Monetary Fund, 1992.
-83-
DHAR, Biswajit. "The Decline of Free Trade and U.S. Trade Policy 
Today." Joumal of World Trade 26: 6 (1992), p. 133-155.
FINGER, J. Michael. "That Old GATT Magic No More Casts Its Spell." 
Joiimal of World Trade 25: 2 (1991), p. 19-23.
FUNABASHI, Yoichi. "Japan and America: Global Partners." Foreign 
Policy 86n992Tp.  24-39.
FOX, Lawrence A. and Stephan Cooney. "Protectionism Returns." 
Foreign Policy 84: 53 (1992), p. 70-88.
GASTER, Robin. "Protectionism with Purpose: Guiding Foreign
Iiwestment." Foreign Policy 88 (1992), p. 91-106.
GILPIN, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. 
New Jersey: Princeton Uniyersity Press, 1987.
HIRST, Paul and Grahame Thopson. "The Problem of Globalization: 
Intemational Economic Relations, National Economic 
Management and the Fomiation of Trading Blocs." Economy and 
Society 21:4 (1992), p. 357-396.
HUGHES, Helen. "The Political Economy of Protection in Eleyen 
Industrial Countries." Issues in World Trade Policy, ed. R. H. 
Snape. Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1987.
-84-
HURRELL, Andrew. "Latin America in the New World Order; A Regional 
Bloc of the Americas?" International Affairs 68; 1 (1992), p. 
121-139.
KAISER, Karl. "A View from Europe; The U.S. Role in the Next Decade." 
International Affairs 65; 2 (1989), p. 5820-5850.
LIEBERMAN, Sima. The Economic and Political Roots of the New 
Protectionism. New Jersey; Rowman and Littlefield, 1988.
LINDERT, Peter. International Economics. Illinois; Irwin Ltd., 1991.
MANSFIELD, Mike. "The U S and Japan; Sharing Our Destinies." 
Foreign Affairs 68; 2 (1988). p. 3-15.
MEAD, Walter Russell. "The United States and the World Economy." 
World Policy Journal 6 (1988-1989). p. 11-57.
MEAD, Walter Russell. "American Economic Policy in the Antemillennial 
Era." World Policy Journal 6 (1988-1989), p. 384-418.
NYE, Joseph S. Jr. "Understanding U.S. Strength." Foreign Policy 
71 (1988), p. 105-129.
NYE, Joseph S. Jr. "Coping with Japan." Foreign Policy 89 (1992), 
p.65-115.
-85-
PASTOR, Robert A. "The Latin American Option." Foreign Policy 
85 (1992), p. 107-119.
PREEG, Ernest H. "The U.S. Leadership Role in World trade; Past, 
Present, and Future." Washington Ouarteiiv 15; 12 (1992), p. 
81-91.
PRESTOWITZ, Clyde V. Jr. "Beyond Laissez Faire." Foreign Policy 
87 (1992), p. 67-87.
RIGAUD, Antoine. "The Greater Community Market and the World 
Market; Dilution or Rebalance?" Contemporary European 
Affairs 1; 2 (1989), p. 175-188.
SCHOTT, Jeffrey J. "Trading Blocs and the World Trading System." The 
World Economy 14; 1 (1991), p. 1-16.
SHARP, Margaret. "Tides of Change; The World Economy and Europe in 
the 1990s." International Affairs 68; 1 (1992), p. 23-30.
SVERNLOV, Carl. "Super 301; Gone But Not Forgotten." Joumal of 
World Trade 26; 3 (1992), p. 125-132.
TUMLIR, Jan. Protectionism; Trade Policy in Democratic Societies. 
Washington, D.C.; American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1985.
-86-
VINAS, Angel. "Community Relations with Latin America: Past, Present, 
and Future." Community After 1992: A New Role in World 
Politics. ed. Amiand Clesse and Raymond Vernon. 
Baden-Baden, 1991.
-87-
